(c) Neither Linkletter nor Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the States’ authority to provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas. Under Teague, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure may not be applied retroactively to cases on federal habeas review unless they place certain primary individual conduct beyond the States’ power to proscribe or are “watershed” rules of criminal procedure. 314, and on federal habeas review, Teague v. 618, 629, but later rejected that standard for cases pending on direct review, Griffith v. (b) The Court first adopted a “retroactivity” standard in Linkletter v. It was not, however, a rule “of own devising” or the product of its own views about sound policy, Crawford, 541 U. (a) Crawford announced a “new rule”-as defined by Teague-because its result “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final,” Teague, 489 U. Held: Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. The State Supreme Court agreed, and also concluded that state courts are not free to give a decision of this Court announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by this Court. The Minnesota trial and appeals courts concluded that Crawford did not apply retroactively under Teague v. 36, 68–69, petitioner sought state postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because admitting the victim’s taped interview at his trial violated Crawford’s rule.
06–8273. Argued October 31, 2007-Decided February 20, 2008Īfter this Court announced a “new rule” for evaluating the reliability of testimonial statements in criminal cases, see Crawford v. Certiorari to the supreme court of minnesota
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